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Non-Technical Summary 
New firm formation is the driving force behind structural changes in the economy. In 
particular, the creation of new jobs is an important macroeconomic issue which is related with 
entrepreneurial activities. It has often been shown that new firms make substantial contributions 
to the labor market. Firm growth is closely connected with this job-providing function. In 
studies that deal with the topic of growth, firm characteristics such as size and age are the most 
frequently considered performance factors. But these characteristics are not set in stone; rather 
they are outcomes of management decisions. Managers – in small businesses usually the 
entrepreneurs themselves – play the dominant role in a firm’s appearance and its development. 
So their entrepreneurial ability is the key factor behind the firm’s success. To some basic degree 
their managerial ability is surely given by nature. However, it also depends to a large extent on 
training. The experience that an entrepreneur gathers while working as a manager can be seen 
as a kind of training. Thus, entrepreneurial experience should be relevant for firm performance. 
The purpose of this paper is to test four hypotheses. The first hypothesis is related to the 
effect of general entrepreneurial experience on firm growth derived from both human capital 
and insider/outsider-theory (H1). The next two hypotheses are linked with the effects of specific 
entrepreneurial experience namely business failure experience. Applying the theory of 
behaviorism and the principal/agent-theory suggests that experience of failure should have a 
negative effect on firm performance (H2a). On the other hand, both the general validity of the 
human capital theory and selection mechanisms suggests positive effects (H2b). Lastly, the 
third hypothesis is based on time effects and proposes that the effects of experience disappear 
with firm age (H3). 
To show the influence of entrepreneurial experience on firm growth the employment growth 
rate as the dependent variable is fitted to a set of independent growth determinants. In order to 
control for firm survival the Heckman selection correction is applied. Additionally, a semi-
parametric specification is used to relax presumptions of the parametric model. 
The results of the analyses partly confirm human capital theory: entrepreneurial experience 
has a positive impact on firm performance – provided it is not failure experience. That is, 
previous experience of business ownership enhances firm performance. But this effect is 
outweighed if the previous firm has failed, leading to an overall negative effect. Other 
experience and indicators of higher human capital such as within-industry experience or 
academic education confirm the hypothesis again. Effects of initial experience vanish in the 
medium term. 
The results suggest that failed entrepreneurs do not benefit from their general entrepreneurial 
experience and are – in terms of employment growth – generally less successful than other 
experienced and novice entrepreneurs. Previously failed entrepreneurs are intimidated, which 
leads to a lowered firm performance. That is, if restart firms survive they contribute (as single 
firms) less to employment creation than other young firms. 
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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of entrepreneurial 
experience on firm growth. According to the human capital theory, 
individuals who have higher ‘human capital’ are more successful than 
others. Entrepreneurial experience is a kind of human capital and, 
therefore, should affect firm performance positively. In reality, 
however, not all types of experience indicate enhanced knowledge 
alone. Bad experience, here the experience of failure, might equally be 
a signal for entrepreneurial weakness and, thus, an argument for 
exercising restraint in possible further business ventures. The 
ambiguous effects of this failure experience on firm success necessitate 
an in-depth analysis of the issue. Therefore, this paper contains an 
empirical comparison of firms involving experienced entrepreneurs and 
novice firms. The analysis shows that entrepreneurial experience affects 
firm growth positively. Accounting for failure experience separately 
reveals a negative effect. Interpreting this finding in combination with 
other control measures indicates that failed entrepreneurs indeed behave 
more cautiously regarding firm growth. 
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Introduction 
New firm formation is the driving force behind structural changes in the economy. In 
particular, the creation of new jobs is an important macroeconomic issue which is related with 
entrepreneurial activities. It has often been shown that new firms make substantial contributions 
to the labor market (see Fritsch, 1992 for an overview). Firm growth is closely connected with 
this job-providing function. In studies that deal with the topic of growth, firm characteristics 
such as size and age are the most frequently considered performance factors (e.g. Evans [1987], 
Hall [1987], Cabral [1995] or Hymer and Pashigian [1962]). But these characteristics are not set 
in stone; rather they are outcomes of management decisions. Managers – in small businesses 
usually the entrepreneurs themselves – play the dominant role in a firm’s appearance and its 
development. So their entrepreneurial ability is the key factor behind the firm’s success. To 
some basic degree their managerial ability is surely given by nature. However, it also depends 
to a large extent on training. The experience that an entrepreneur gathers while working as a 
manager can be seen as a kind of training. Thus, entrepreneurial experience should be relevant 
for firm performance. 
The purpose of this paper is to test four hypotheses. The first hypothesis is related to the 
effect of general entrepreneurial experience on firm growth derived from both human capital 
and insider/outsider-theory (H1). The next two hypotheses are linked with the effects of specific 
entrepreneurial experience namely business failure experience. Applying the theory of 
behaviorism and the principal/agent-theory suggests that experience of failure should have a 
negative effect on firm performance (H2a). On the other hand, both the general validity of the 
human capital theory and selection mechanisms suggests positive effects (H2b). Lastly, the 
third hypothesis is based on time effects and proposes that the effects of experience disappear 
with firm age (H3). 
While the influence of general entrepreneurial experience on the growth of firms has often 
been discussed, the effect of experience of failure has not. Only very few studies have done so 
explicitly (e.g. BCG [2002] or Kay et al. [2004]). In order to broaden the empirical work on the 
effects of failure experience, it is thus useful to examine how such experience affects firm 
growth. 
Until now the literature on firm performance that includes information about entrepreneurs 
has mainly been based on analyzing survey data collected from one single member of the 
management (e.g. Brüderl et al. [1996], Bosma et al. [2000], Kay et al. [2004], Westhead and 
Wright [1998b] or Westhead and Wright [1998a]). This study uses the ZEW Foundation Panel 
to test the hypotheses, making it possible to analyze firm growth using information on the entire 
management team. This avoids neglecting information about potential additional team members 
which is usually hidden in most survey designs. 
The analysis herein focuses on companies that start out as “midget” firms, i.e. with less than 
ten employees. This ensures that firms are introduced in which one single entrepreneur has the 
most influence, since these firms usually have a limited number of owners.  
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In order to get reliable estimates the analysis has to address the issue of a potential survivor 
bias caused by the drop-out of observations during the period under consideration. The bias is 
taken into account by applying the selection correction procedure developed by Heckman 
[1979]. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 contains a brief discussion of 
the theoretical foundation on which the hypotheses are based. Section 2 contains a review of the 
literature on the topic to date and Section 3 introduces data and methodology. Descriptive 
statistics and the estimation results are presented and analyzed in Section 4 before Section 5 
closes the paper with some summarizing conclusions. 
1 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Managerial ability is one of the key factors behind firm performance. In assessing this 
ability, economists consider the level of qualification a person has attained as crucial. The most 
important theory in this context is human capital theory (Mincer [1974], Becker [1985]) which 
was originally applied to explain wage differences. It hypothesizes that investments in skills 
through formal education, on-the-job training or professional experience increase the 
productivity of workers, which is rewarded in the labor market by higher earnings. The theory 
can also be applied to explain differences in earnings from self-employment, if we hypothesize 
that human capital investments increase founders’ productivity, thereby enhancing business 
performance. As mentioned above, experience is part of the founder’s human capital. 
According to Reuber and Fischer [1999] there are two ways in which a founder’s previous 
experience impacts firm performance: Firstly, it leads to the “development of experientially-
acquired skills or expertise which will lead in turn to more knowledgeable actions and 
decisions”. Secondly, as founders are inclined to start businesses which are similar (e.g. in terms 
of industry, geographic area) to organizations with which they are familiar, their experience 
influences the characteristics of the businesses they start up. These, in turn, affect performance.  
Similarly, Brüderl et al. [1996] suggest that human capital impacts firm performance 
indirectly through start-up conditions. Human capital probably affects the start-up’s a priori 
prospects of success. Individuals with a high human capital endowment will find it easier to 
obtain financial capital, gather information and plan the start-up carefully. Consequently, they 
are more likely to develop a promising business idea and to create more favorable start-up 
conditions than individuals with a lower human capital endowment. Once a business 
opportunity is developed or identified, human capital is “crucial in accessing and leveraging 
[the] social, financial, physical and organizational resources” required to exploit it (Ucbasaran 
et al. [2003]).  
Positive effects of entrepreneurial experience can also be derived from the insider/outsider-
theory. Experienced entrepreneurs may already have business contacts that help them to 
discover opportunities without actively searching (Westhead et al. [2005]). The result would be 
more effective information search behavior. Prior experience of business ownership can 
therefore be associated with assets like extended networks, increased expertise and a good 
reputation with financiers, customers and suppliers. 
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Summarizing, the first hypothesis can be put forward as follows: 
H1: Due to human capital effects and insider advantages, entrepreneurial 
experience positively affects firm performance. 
Failure experience is a special type of business ownership experience. Therefore, it might 
also have a specific effect on the success of a firm. All in all, only few studies on firm 
performance take this type of experience into account. There appear only to be two analyses 
that consider ‘experience of failure’ explicitly (BCG [2002] and Kay et al. [2004]). Several 
theories provide a theoretical foundation for the effects of failure experience. 
Behaviorism (e.g. Day [1971]), for example, would suggest that entrepreneurs who have 
‘burned their fingers’ with a failed business will be more risk averse in future. Due to a changed 
attitude to growth they will probably behave more cautiously lowering expected performance.  
Similarly, thinking in terms of the principal/agent-theory (e.g. Holmström [1979] or 
Holmström and Costa [1986]) the ‘stigma’ of having gone bankrupt might be harmful for firm 
success. Principals, that is, for example, different stakeholders, like loan officers or suppliers, 
are faced with the problems of hidden information and intention. They try to compensate for 
their lack of information by referring to the entrepreneur’s history. Failure sends a negative 
signal to them, making it difficult for the would-be founder in question to obtain credit or 
establish customer and supplier relations. Indeed, there is evidence that the normal credit market 
is barred for failed entrepreneurs, who therefore rely more heavily on alternative sources of 
funding, e.g. “family, friends and fools” (Kay et al. [2004]). “In Europe, young firms tend to 
have strategies that are not very aggressive” (Landier [2003], p. 24). In such an environment the 
“stigma of failure plays the role of a discipline device” reducing moral hazard and preventing 
entrepreneurs from taking risk excessively. Indeed, this mechanism helps creditors to assess the 
reliability of debtors; but on the other hand it also suppresses business chances if risk taking is 
simply necessary. The risk-taking attitude of creditors is only slowly improving in Germany, 
and stigmatization of failed entrepreneurs is still widespread among them. This stigmatization 
worsens founding conditions which in turn negatively affects firm performance (Geroski et al. 
[2003]). Additionally, most firms in the sample filed for bankruptcy under the old insolvency 
rules. Therefore, their entrepreneurs cannot file for debt relief and it is likely that they are 
subject to the “near-lifelong possibility of debt enforcement of 30 years” (Schwehr [2003], p. 
15) by their previous creditors. If the creditors assert their repayment claims it would mean a 
drain of liquid assets and, thus, a growth restriction for these firms.  
On the other hand, there is also a selection mechanism that suggests that experience of failure 
can have a positive effect on the success of the newly-started business. Entrepreneurs who 
experience failure but then start a new business are a selective group out of all entrepreneurs, 
since most business failures are a one-way street: for several reasons, a business failure very 
frequently brings entrepreneurial careers to an end. This might be due to the fact that failed 
entrepreneurs have to overcome several obstacles (e.g. higher capital restrictions, see above) 
that previously successful entrepreneurs do not face if they want to re-establish. The additional 
obstacles are ‘entry barriers’ for failed entrepreneurs. Only entrepreneurs who undertake serious 
attempts to venture again will withstand the pre-start-up phase successfully. Entrepreneurs who 
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are observable, therefore, are a positive sample of all entrepreneurs who failed previously. 
Others may have tried to establish anew, but had the opportunity to do so. 
From these two conflicting arguments, competing hypotheses can be formulated as follows: 
H2a: Experience of failure causes risk-aversion and worse starting 
conditions resulting in a lower performance compared to other experienced 
entrepreneurs. 
H2b: Experience of failure is a kind of entrepreneurial experience and 
previously failed entrepreneurs who are observable are a positive selection. 
These factors lead to an above average performance of their firms. 
Finally, one could argue that there must be a time effect. With every year in entrepreneurship 
novices gather experience. This reduces the (potential) advantage that entrepreneurs already 
experienced from former businesses have over them with regard to the current business. The 
advantage of experience should thus be especially noticeable in the early start-up phase, i.e. in 
the first five years and vanish as the firm gets older. 
H3: The impact of initial entrepreneurial experience on firm growth 
disappears at later growth stages. 
2 Related Literature 
The findings of Wagner [1999] or Stam et al. [2006] indicate that the decision of ex-
entrepreneurs to go back into business depends on a large extent on insider knowledge. They 
are more prone to start anew if they get the chance to reestablish within already known 
industries. Furthermore, they often follow ‘role models’, i.e. follow other entrepreneurs they 
know, often also family and friends, as examples. Thus, renascent entrepreneurs profit from 
former contacts. 
Colombo et al. [2004] find that start-up size is higher if entrepreneurs have entrepreneurial 
experience or experience, e.g. managerial or work experience, in the same sector. Taylor [1999] 
confirms that self-employment experience has positive effects on survival, and Åstebro and 
Bernhardt [2002] observe that education, general work experience and prior ownership 
experience have a positive effect on start-up capital. Bosma et al. [2000] yield similar results, 
relating to the three types of experience. They find that self-employment experience has a 
positive effect on profits. Experience as an employee increases the probability that the newly-
founded business will survive. Experience in the sector positively influences both survival 
chances and profits. Additionally, Abdesselam et al. [2004] find that the entrepreneur’s sector-
specific experience is an important feature of surviving firms. 
Previous literature gives evidence that experienced entrepreneurs outperform their rivals –
except in terms of employment growth: Brüderl et al. [1996], Bosma et al. [2000], Westhead 
and Wright [1998b] and Kay et al. [2004], can’t find any significant performance differences 
between experienced and novice entrepreneurs with respect to changes in employment. 
The Boston Consulting Group (BCG [2002]) performed an analysis based on a sample of 
Europe’s 500 fastest growing companies. BCG illustrated the firms’ turnover growth and job 
creation, differentiated according to the entrepreneurial background of their founders. 
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Companies founded by entrepreneurs with experience of failure excel in achieving faster 
growth of both turnover and employment. Because of this, BCG claim that learning from failure 
accelerates growth. Kay et al. [2004] try to verify the findings econometrically. Their analysis is 
based on a survey of founders localized in Cologne. They hypothesize that entrepreneurs who 
have experience of failure might outperform others, mainly due to the human capital effect. 
However, they cannot confirm their hypothesis. 
Brüderl et al. [1996] find that experience in the sector of the current business has a positive 
effect on growth. They explain the positive effect of entrepreneurial experience within the 
relevant industry in terms of specific insider/outsider effects. As an insider the entrepreneur 
knows about the minimum efficient scale in the relevant industry and will look to increase 
employment more rapidly. Besides, she/he can use already established customer and supplier 
relations, thus avoiding initial search costs and enabling the business to increase the operating 
rate. 
The characteristic which is maybe most often associated with human capital is education. Its 
positive effect on firm success (i.e. profits and survival) is confirmed by several studies (e.g. 
Storey [1982] or Bosma et al. [2000]) but its impact on employment growth is ambiguous. 
Schutjens and Wever [2000] reject the claim that education levels have any effect on 
employment growth as do Bosma et al. [2000]. On the other hand, Nerlinger [1996] shows that 
firms whose entrepreneurs are technically or managerially educated perform better than others. 
3 Data and Methodology 
Database 
For the firm growth analysis, this study makes use of the ZEW Foundation Panel (see Almus 
et al. [2000] for details). The panel relies on information provided by Creditreform, the largest 
German credit rating agency. The unit of registration is the company itself rather than any 
subsidiaries, i.e. this investigation is based on original foundation events ignoring affiliated 
foundations. Freelancers are also registered if they show a necessary minimum of business 
activity. But in all, freelancers are underrepresented in the data (Harhoff and Steil [1997]). 
They account for roughly 7 percent of the observations. 
The data contains not only general information about newly founded firms in Germany but 
also details about individuals whose entrepreneurial activities have been observed 
longitudinally. The information about firm-owners’ entrepreneurial careers allows for the 
identification of those persons who have established two or more companies. Due to the belief 
that the influence of single entrepreneurs is strongest in smaller enterprises the analysis 
concentrates on firms of midget class according to EUROSTAT’s official classification. That is, 
only firms with initially less than 10 employees are under consideration. 
The complete set of covariates is not available for all of the firms identified. In order to 
preserve a maximum number of observations the approach advocated by Cohen and Cohen 
[1983] is applied to variables with a large number of missing values. In this approach, separate 
dummy variables were generated taking on the value one, if the relevant variable shows missing 
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values. The missing values themselves were then coded as zero. The data preparation results in 
a sample of about 220.000 firms founded since 1995. 
Definitional Issues 
My particular interest is to analyze the effect of entrepreneurial experience on firm 
performance. Novices are self-employed for the first time and do not have entrepreneurial 
experience by definition. Experienced entrepreneurs can be differentiated into entrepreneurs 
founding a new firm alongside an existing one (so called ‘portfolio entrepreneurs’) and 
entrepreneurs who abandon a business prior to reestablishing (so called ‘restarters’). For the 
latter group of entrepreneurs it is important to have a look at how and why they abandon their 
first business. 
As illustrated in Table 1, Stokes and Blackburn [2001] suggest categorizing entrepreneurs 
who have closed a business once into classes. Depending on the financial conditions of the 
business closure on the one hand and the attitude of the respective entrepreneurs to business 
ownership on the other, they find four types of entrepreneurs. Hence, there is the ‘determined 
entrepreneur’, the ‘serial entrepreneur’, the ‘failed entrepreneur’ and the ‘discouraged 
entrepreneur’.  
Table 1: Closure Experience and Entrepreneur Types 
Financial Conditions of the Closed Business   
Ailing Thriving  
 
‘Determined Entrepreneur’ 
Despite problems in previous 
venture, they return to business 
ownership determined to do better. 
‘Serial Entrepreneur’ 
Having succeeded in previous 
venture, they return with resources to 
invest in new business. 
Encouraged 
‘Failed Entrepreneur 
The problem of previous ventures 
discouraged them from re-entering into 
business ownership. 
‘Discouraged Entrepreneur’ 
Although their previous business 
venture succeeded, they do not wish 
to repeat the experience. 
Discouraged 
A
ttitude of the Ex- 
O
w
ner to Business 
 O
w
nership 
Source: Following Stokes and Blackburn [2001], p.29; own illustration. 
According to this classification, previously failed restarters would fall into the category of 
‘determined entrepreneurs’. However, Everett and Watson emphasize that in the previous 
literature “generally, the definition of failure used has, to a large extent, depended on the nature 
of the data available” (Everett and Watson [1998], p. 374). Since the ZEW Foundation Panel 
contains exact status information with regard to bankruptcy proceedings, ‘bankruptcy’ is used 
as the main event that constitutes firm closure. These bankruptcy events are mainly firm 
bankruptcies. But, due to the record of micro firms and freelancers personal bankruptcies are 
taken into account partly, too. Using bankruptcies, rather than including all firms which closed 
after running into difficulties, I am able to focus exactly on the firms that failed. The definition 
of ‘determined entrepreneurs’ is thus interpreted in a very narrow sense. 
In summary, a determined entrepreneur in the narrow sense is considered as someone who 
suffers bankruptcy – regardless of whether she/he was a member of the founding team or 
merely joined an existing firm – and who launches a new business at some time after it. When 
the term ‘restarters’ is used in the following, such entrepreneurs are meant. The firm with which 
the restarter failed needs to be the first establishment in the restarter’s entrepreneurial career. 
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This is because otherwise she/he would no longer be a pure restarter, but rather a serial 
entrepreneur and thus predisposed differently. In accordance with our definition of restarters, 
‘restart firms’ are defined as companies in which at least one restart entrepreneur participates. 
Furthermore, firms in which at least one entrepreneur who has entrepreneurial experience but is 
not a restarter participates are called ‘follow-up firms’. In order to analyze the effect of failure 
experience correctly I consider only the performance of the firm following directly after the 
failed firm. Altogether, more than 1,200 restart firms are available from the database according 
to the above criteria. These are included in the analysis.  
To assess firm performance I use employment growth which is a common measure of 
growth. It is very appropriate as a growth indicator as it is closely related with the value added 
that is generated by the firm. The applied overall relative employment growth rate ri is 
measured as 
1
0
−= EEi Tr  
where E0 is the number of employees at the start of the observation period and ET at the end.  
In order to test the third hypothesis the growth rates are calculated for two different time 
periods. Period 1 comprises firm growth within a maximum of five years from foundation on, 
i.e. E0 is the initial start-up size counting in the entrepreneur(s) Period 2 covers the growth from 
the firm’s fifth year until ten years after foundation (i.e. E0 for period 2 is the employee stock 
when the firm is aged five). In both cases the considered period ends if a relevant entrepreneur 
leaves the firm.1 
Variables 
Firm performance depends on entrepreneur characteristics, firm characteristics and 
characteristics of the region in which the firm was founded. The values of most variables are for 
the times when the firms were founded. Data on the entrepreneur is introduced because the 
basic research question relies on it. With information about the entrepreneur’s experience and 
human capital endowment it is possible to test the human-capital-related hypothesis. Firm 
information can be used, for example, to control for the role played by any debt burden 
remaining from failure (by including firm’s initial credit reliability) as well as for industry-
specific behavior. Last but not least, some regional conditions are considered relevant. 
Accounting for agglomeration effects like advanced spillovers or the concentration of highly 
educated individuals in urban areas is as important as including regional economic founding 
conditions which have long-lasting effects on a firm’s growth and survival (Geroski et al. 
[2003]). 
In the regression analysis on the determinants of employment growth, both an indicator of 
general entrepreneurial experience and an indicator of experience of failure as a particular kind 
of experience are included. Both indicators are introduced at the firm-level, that is, they are set 
to one if at least one entrepreneur who fits the respective definition is involved in the particular 
firm. The existence of entrepreneurial experience is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
the indication of failure experience. Thus, the failure indicator is an interaction variable between 
the existence of entrepreneurial experience and the existence of failure experience. Intra-
industry entrepreneurial experience is included in a similar way. 
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Econometric Specification 
To show the influence of entrepreneurial experience on firm growth the employment growth 
rate as the dependent variable is fitted to a set of independent growth determinants. However, 
only firms that survive provide the necessary information for preparing the growth measure. 
This generates a ‘survivor-bias’ which distorts the sample. The probability of survival is 
determined by various indicators in a way similar to that in which the actual firm growth 
depends on several characteristics. Econometrically this dependency can be modeled as2 
1111 uxy += β  
[ ]01 222 >+= vxy δ  
assuming that y1 is observed only when y2 = 1. In order to correct the selection bias Heckman 
(1979) suggested regressing yi1 on xi1, λ(xi,δ2). A consistent estimator of the unknown δ2 can be 
obtained from the first-stage Probit regression resulting in estimated inverse Mills 
ratios ( ) ( ) ( )2222 / δδφδλλ )))) iiii xxx Φ≡≡ . Finally, yi1 can be fitted on 21, iix λ) , i = 1, 2,…, N1. 
The Heckman selection correction is modeled parametrically and assumes joint normality of 
the error terms (u1, v3). The violation of this assumption results in biased estimates. For that 
reason it is prudent to relax the assumption by also applying a semi-parametric model. The 
semi-parametric estimate is characterized by the fact that it allows the joint distribution of the 
error terms (u1, v3) to have an unknown form. Following Newey et al. [1990] it is possible to 
estimate a series approximation to attain a selection correction instead of using the inverse Mills 
ratio. Doing so gives 
( ) ( )∑
=
≅
J
j
ijjii zpz
1
33 δηδλ
)))
 
where ηj are unknown coefficients and pj are known “basis” functions. A way to avoid multi-
collinearity is to set up pj as polynomials (Newey, 1988). Here, the applied functional form of pj 
results in the following specification of the selection correction term 
( ) ( )[ ]∑
=
−Φ×≅
J
j
j
ijii zz
1
33 12 δηδλ
)))
 
Newey noticed that the setting of the “smoothing” parameter J depends on the particular 
sample. An approach to work out J is to estimate several test regressions increasing J 
incrementally. Comparing each regression’s goodness of fit, one can look for the best 
specification and therefore the value of J which is most appropriate. 
In order to obtain robust estimates, bootstrapped standard errors are computed for both 
specifications, i.e. for the Heckman as well as the 2SLS model. The standard error correction is 
based on two hundred bootstrap iterations for each specification. 
Summarizing, four regressions with two different basic specifications are estimated. That is, 
for both consideration periods, i.e. from zero to a maximum of five years and from five to a 
maximum of ten years, both the standard Heckman selection specification and the 2SLS model 
using a semi-parametric specification of the selection correction term are applied. The base 
category in all the specifications is the group of novice entrepreneurs. 
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4 Empirical Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Some descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2. Regarding employment growth in period 1, 
follow-up firms show higher growth rates than other firms; in period two the growth rates do 
not differ significantly. In contrast to multivariate analyses, bivariate comparisons do not 
include control variables. Therefore these results might also be attributable to other effects like 
underlying growth periods of average different length. The median values of zero indicate that 
the distribution of the growth rates is extremely skewed. That is because most of the firms 
considered do not grow or at least do not change their employment stock much. 
As already mentioned, it is necessary to account for firm survival to get undistorted results. 
In the first five years after foundation roughly 19 percent of novices’ firms exit the market. This 
is less than in the case of follow-up and restart firms, where 23 and 28 percent of the firms 
respectively were closed. On reaching the age of five up to ten years after foundation a further 
18 percent of the novices’ firms are shut down compared to an additional 10 percent of follow-
up and 12 percent of restart firms. 
Within industry entrepreneurial experience of course only applies to follow-up and restart 
firms. The share of those who have within industry experience is with 4 percentage points 
slightly but significantly higher in the group of restart firms. That is, restarters remain true to 
their previous industry more often than previously ‘successful’ entrepreneurs. 
Compared to both other groups the share of firms with university-educated entrepreneurs is 
more than 6 percent higher in the group of follow-up firms. That is, graduate entrepreneurs 
seem to be more prone to reestablish than others. Contrarily, the share of firms in which master 
craftsmen – as a measure for vocational education – are involved is almost a third lower. 
‘Master craftsman’ is a German-specific title. It can be attained by completing a dual 
apprenticeship which is separated into schooling and professional training, gathering some 
working experience in the respective sector afterwards, and passing a concluding examination. 
Given these preconditions, the diploma can be seen as a measure that captures professional 
within industry experience as well as technical skills and knowledge. 
Novice firms that are considered when running the analysis for the first period have existed 
for an average of three years. This is slightly more than follow-up firms. Restart firms are half a 
year younger on average. This means that the higher employment growth rate of follow-up 
firms cannot depend exclusively on a time effect. In all, firms that fall into the second period are 
seven years old on average. 
Creditreform’s assessment of the credit reliability differs significantly between the three firm 
categories. The share of firms for which Creditreform recommend “care is advisable” is only 
slightly higher for follow-up firms compared to novices but round about 20 percentage points 
larger in the group of restart firms. That is, two fifths of the restart firms are assessed as being 
somewhat precarious in this manner. After five years the assessment is even worse. Then care is 
advisable for roundabout 50 percent of novice and follow-up firms and three quarters of the 
restart businesses. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Novice Firms 
Follow-Up 
Firms ex RSF 
Restart 
Firms (RSF) Variables 
  
Unit 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Significance
Level(i) 
Employment Growth(ii)      
 Period 1   82.2 - 111.2 - 77.1 - 1a, 3b 
 Period 2   
Percentage Points
10.6 - 9.0 - 14.0 - - 
Survival Rate       
 Period 1   80.9 - 77.1 - 71.5 - 1a, 2a, 3a 
 Period 2   
Percent 
92.0 - 89.5 - 88.2 - 1a, 2a 
Within Industry Experience   Percent - - 24.6 - 28.1 - 2a, 3a 
Education      
 Formal (graduates)   30.5 - 37.0 - 30.7 - 1a, 2a, 3a 
 Vocational (master craftsmen)   
Percent 
15.4 - 10.1 - 12.9 - 1a, 2a, 3a 
Firm Age      
 Period 1   3.0 3.0 2.8 3.0 2.4 2.0 1a, 2a, 3a 
 Period 2   
Years 
7.1 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 1a, 2a 
Credit Reliability(iii): “care is advisable”       
 At Start-Up   22.0 - 24.3 - 41.2 - 1a, 2a, 3a 
 After Five Years   Percent 47.0 - 52.7 - 74.5 - 1a, 2a, 3a 
Team Foundation   Percent 21.3 - 34.8 - 31.3 - 1a, 2a, 3a 
Start-Up Size   # of Employees 2.1 1.0 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.0 1a, 2a, 3b 
Size at Firms’ Fifth Year   # of Employees 3.9 2.0 5.0 2.7 3.8 2.0 1a, 3c 
Limited Liability Legal Form   Percent 37.5 - 53.9 - 50.7 - 1a, 2a, 3b 
Industry Structure       
 Technology-Intensive Manufacturing   1,5 - 1,8 - 1,3 - 1a, 3c 
 Remaining Manufacturing   5,1 - 5,1 - 6,0 - 3b 
 Tech.- and Knowledge-Based Services   12,6 - 14,3 - 12,9 - 1a 
 Remaining Company-Related Services   6,1 - 7,8 - 6,9 - 1a, 3c 
 Consumer Services   21,2 - 23,8 - 14,5 -  
 Construction   15,1 - 11,3 - 27,2 - 1a, 2a, 3a 
 Trade Services   29,9 - 26,8 - 23,8 - 1a, 2a, 3b 
 Holdings   
Percent 
0,8 - 2,4 - 1,0 - 1a, 3a 
Region Type (metropolitan districts)   Percent 52,0 - 55,2 - 54,1 - 1a, 2c 
National GDP Growth Rate (annual basis)   Percentage Points 1,52 1,5 1,43 1,4 1,11 1,2 1a, 2a, 3a 
(i)  Significance levels on performing a t-test on mean differences between novice firms and follow-up firms ex RSF (1), 
 between novice firms and restart firms (2) and between follow-up firms ex RSF and restart firms (3). 
 Significance levels: a = 99 percent, b = 95 percent and c = 90 percent. 
(ii)  Period 1: up to five years after foundation; period 2: from firm age of five to ten years at most. 
(iii)  Assessment Provided by Creditreform. 
 
Source: ZEW Foundation Panel. 
The share of follow-up firms and restart firms that are founded by entrepreneurial teams is 
higher than that of novice firms. More than 30 percent of the follow-up and restart firms are 
multi-owned compared to little more than a fifth of the novices. That is, novice entrepreneurs 
tend to establish firms only by themselves rather than in a team. 
50 percent of the novice entrepreneurs employ one employee at start-up, i.e. they employ 
only themselves. Against it, half of the follow-up entrepreneurs provide a workplace for 
somebody else additionally: they employ initially 2 persons when they found a firm. 
Besides, the share of novice firms that choose legal forms with unlimited liability is about 15 
percentage points lower compared to the others. This may largely be due to the learning process 
the experienced entrepreneurs have undergone. However, the higher share of team foundations 
may also play a role. 
The main differences in industry structure that emerge from the comparison of the three 
groups can be seen in consumer services, construction, and trade services. Restarts occur to a 
distinctly smaller degree in consumer services. Only 15 percent of the reestablishments are 
affiliated to consumer services while a fifth of novice and follow-up firms take place there. The 
share of novice firms affiliated to construction is 4 percentage points higher in share than that of 
experienced firms, and trade services are over-represented to a similar extent. 27 percent of 
restart firms are registered in construction.3 Construction firms are consistently under suspicion 
of using bankruptcy as a means to get rid of warrantee claims. Due to this, the high share 
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nurtures distrust and the belief that such firms may deliberately sail too close to the wind. Yet 
there is no evidence for such behavior (Metzger [2006]). The sector distribution just shows a 
greater presence of restarter firms in one important ‘small trade’-industry (construction) 
compared to another (consumer services). 
With regard to location there is only a slight significant difference. Follow-up firms are 
slightly more often located in agglomerations than novices, but in all thee groups more than 50 
percent of the firms site in metropolitan districts rather than in rural areas. 
The growth rate of the national GDP is taken for the year in which each firm was founded, to 
control for the economic conditions at start-up. On average, the years in which restarter firms 
are founded seem to be economically less favorable than the years of other firms’ start-up. This 
might indicate that restarters found out of necessity, while other entrepreneurs base their 
decision on perceived opportunity. 
Estimation Results 
Table 3 displays the estimation results of the growth equations and their preceding selection 
equations. The first three estimates, i.e. Models A, B and their underlying selection equation, 
provide results concerning the analysis for period 1 firms (i.e. young firms). The Models C, D 
and the second selection equation analyze firm growth in period 2 (i.e. middle-aged firms). 
Effects on the Growth of Young Firms 
Comparing the results of the Models A and B, i.e. of the parametric specification, with those of 
the semi-parametric approach reveals no essential changes in the significance of the 
coefficients. However, the scale of some coefficients differs clearly in amplitude. A Hausman-
test can be used to check whether these differences are systematic. The χ2 test statistic of 178.38 
is far beyond the critical value meaning that H0 and, thus, unsystematic differences in 
coefficients are rejected. This indicates that the assumption of joint normality of the error terms 
presumed in the parametric Heckman model is not given leading to biased estimates. 
Consequently, the results of Model B are more reliable and are interpreted in the following. 
The results suggest that general entrepreneurial experience has a positive significant effect 
on employment growth. That means that at least one managing firm owner having 
entrepreneurial experience increases the firm’s employment growth. This result confirms 
hypothesis H1 but contradicts the findings of related studies. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurial experience affects firm growth if the experience is in the form 
of business failure. Employment growth decreases if at least one entrepreneur is a restarter 
according to the definition above. That is, firms in which entrepreneurs with bankruptcy 
experience are involved perform worse than other follow-up firms. Since restarters are a 
subgroup of all experienced entrepreneurs the coefficients of both experience indicators have to 
be added to get the effective impact of failure experience. The absolute effect of failure 
experience is larger in scale than the impact of general entrepreneurial experience. So, not only 
do restart firms perform less well than other experienced firms but their growth is even lower 
than that of novice firms. Owing to this, hypothesis H2a is confirmed and hypothesis H2b has 
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Table 3: Estimations on Firm Growth 
Dependent Variable: Employment Growth   Model A Model B Selection Equation   Model C Model D Selection Equation 
  Heckman Semi-Parametric 2SLS (Model A/B)   Heckman Semi-Parametric 2SLS (Model C/D) Main Explanatory Variables 
  Coef. Robust SE(i) Coef. Robust SE(i) Coef. Robust SE(i)   Coef. Robust SE(i) Coef. Robust SE(i) Coef. Robust SE(i) 
Entrepreneurial Experience                        
 General Experience   0.085 * (0.051) 0.139 *** (0.051) -0.153 *** (0.011)   -0.022  (0.017) -0.021  (0.017) -0.235 *** (0.037) 
 Failure Experience    -0.218 ** (0.094) -0.161 * (0.097) -0.147 *** (0.039)   0.065  (0.068) 0.065  (0.061) -0.057 ** (0.154) 
 Within-Industry Experience   0.261 *** (0.090) 0.260 *** (0.091) -0.031  (0.021)   0.004  (0.023) 0.004  (0.024) -0.002  (0.068) 
Education                  
 Formal (graduates)   0.167 *** (0.046) 0.098 ** (0.046) 0.179 *** (0.013)   0.020  (0.014) 0.020  (0.012) 0.203 *** (0.033) 
 Vocational (master craftsmen)   0.077  (0.055) -0.032  (0.056) 0.281 *** (0.016)   0.007  (0.013) 0.007  (0.014) 0.213 *** (0.038) 
Control Variables                  
Firm Age resp. Growth Period (years)   0.342 *** (0.016) 0.224 *** (0.020) 0.342 *** (0.002)   0.119 *** (0.012) 0.119 *** (0.011) 0.699 *** (0.012) 
Assessment of Credit Reliability(ii) 
 “care is advisable”   -0.172 *** (0.035) -0.155 *** (0.034) -0.176 *** (0.009)   -0.006  (0.008) -0.006  (0.008) -0.405 *** (0.020) 
Team Foundation   0.103 *** (0.026) 0.128 *** (0.027) -0.066 *** (0.008)   0.030 *** (0.010) 0.030 *** (0.009) -0.110 *** (0.024) 
Firms Size (# of employees)   -0.300 *** (0.006) -0.287 *** (0.006) -0.051 *** (0.002)   -0.031 *** (0.002) -0.031 *** (0.002) 0.004  (0.005) 
Limited Liability Legal Form   0.871 *** (0.032) 0.950 *** (0.035) -0.184 *** (0.009)   0.056 *** (0.010) 0.056 *** (0.009) -0.173 *** (0.021) 
Region Type (metropolitan district)   0.050 ** (0.025) 0.073 *** (0.025) -0.048 *** (0.009)   -0.005  (0.008) -0.005  (0.008) -0.077 *** (0.023) 
National GDP Growth Rate (annual basis)   1.496  (1.554) 0.618  (1.600) 3.470 *** (0.357)   0.887  (0.650) 0.886  (0.621) 3.791 *** (1.061) 
Selection Instruments                  
 Assessment of Payment Behavior(ii)                  
  “term of payment kept”        0.310 *** (0.009)       0.190 *** (0.027) 
  “term of payment only slightly exceeded”        0.196 *** (0.015)       0.034 ** (0.036) 
 Situation as Regards Orders (good) (ii)        -0.009  (0.029)       -0.004 ** (0.063) 
Selection Correction Terms(iii)                  
 Inverse Mills Ratio   -0.146 * (0.051)       0.067 *** (0.186)     
 Polynomial of 1st  degree      -0.610 *** (0.057)       -0.055 * (0.028)   
 Polynomial of 2nd degree      1.465 *** (0.109)           
Constant   0.304  (0.215) 0.364 ** (0.183) -0.092 * (0.051)   0.079  (0.085) 0.135  (0.094) 5.909 *** (0.186) 
Test on Joint Significance of    Wald-Test χ2 (df) Wald-Test F(df) Wald-Test χ2 (df)   Wald-Test χ2 (df) Wald-Test F(df) Wald-Test χ2 (df) 
 Industry Dummies (not reported)   390.80 *** 59.31 *** 477.79 ***   24.23 *** 3.46 *** 19.78 *** 
 Federal State Dummies (not reported)   178.78 *** 9.43 *** 3,457.43 ***   45.36 *** 3.03 *** 385.16 *** 
 Founding Year Dummies (not reported)   173.66 *** 21.50 *** 14,932.09 ***   32.80  8.64 *** 4,285.08 *** 
 Missing-Value Dummies (not reported)   4.35 * 4.24 *** 3,191.25 ***   2.85  1.43  29.06 *** 
Number of Observations   219,898 (censored: 43,158; uncensored: 176,740)   51,798 (censored: 4,234; uncensored: 47,564) 
  Wald-Test χ2 (df) F-Test (df) Adjusted-R2 Log Likelihood Pseudo-R2   Wald-Test χ2 (df) F-Test (df) Adjusted-R2 Log Likelihood Pseudo-R2 Test Statistics/Goodness of Fit of the Models 
  32,125.06 121.68 0.0311 -86,382.65 0.2067   48,863.90 26.82 0.0218 -10,617.64 0.2757 
Significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(i) Bootstrapped standard errors (B = 200); (ii) Assessment provided by Creditreform; (iii) Best fit achieved including selection correction polynomials of 1st and 2nd resp. only 1st degree. 
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to be rejected. The described negative consequences of failure dominate. Since information on 
the firms’ initial credit reliability is included as a control variable potential effects of different 
starting conditions like the access to financial means are negated. The measured effect thus falls 
back to the behavior of the restarter her-/himself. Thus we can conclude that restarters actually 
do behave more cautiously and so they are more restrained regarding growth. But it must be 
said that the finding may be biased by unobservable effects that lead to less favorable results for 
firms found to be restart firms. Since the restarters are separated by the presence of official 
evidence of bankruptcy, there might be, for example, a selection effect prior to the bankruptcy: 
entrepreneurs who look forward and are better able to identify developments that could 
signalize the beginning of the end could opt out of the firm earlier than less clever team 
members. While the latter are counted among entrepreneurs with experience of failure, the 
former are grouped with those without experience of failure even though they actually gained 
some. 
Within-industry experience affects employment growth significant positively. Its coefficient 
is the largest of all experience indicators. Therewith, experienced entrepreneurs – including 
restarters – who reestablish in the same industry again outperform other entrepreneurs. 
Regarding education I found ambiguous results. While the human capital theory works for 
formal education – graduate entrepreneurs seem to out-perform other founders, confirming H1 
this time – vocational education is insignificant and thus of no importance for employment 
growth. As explained above, having a master craftsmen diploma is used as measure of 
vocational experience. Besides its educational element it can also be seen as a specific 
investment into entrepreneurship: the crafts sector has been highly regulated, that is, the 
diploma was a necessary condition for establishing. But maybe this non-effect is inherent 
because craft firms are typically born small and stay small. 
The estimated regressions have been specified in such a way that potential selection 
distortions are taken into account. The high significance of the selection correction terms 
indicates that selection biases exist and that correction was obviously necessary. 
Effects on the Growth of Middle-Aged Firms 
Applying a Hausman-test on the Models C and D delivers a χ2 test statistic of 0.38. 
Unsystematic differences in coefficients are, thus, not rejected. That is, the assumption of joint 
normality of the error terms holds this time and the parametric specification passes the test. 
Since the results of Model C and D not differ statistically both models are similarly reliable. 
The latter columns of Table 3 display the estimation results based on period 2. The 
coefficients of the human capital variables have ceased to be significant. Only several control 
variables remain significant. These include, for example, the basis variables from which the 
growth rate was computed, like the length of the considered growth period, or the employment 
stock from which the growth process started at five years. This result confirms hypothesis H3 
which claims that effects of the initial human capital vanish in the medium-term. Effects of 
initial experience are perhaps offset by learning effects, i.e. the impact of experience gathered 
by routine work. 
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5 Conclusions 
The object of this paper has been to analyze the influence of entrepreneurial experience on 
firm performance. To achieve this, firms’ employment growth is considered. A main aim is to 
account for a special type of entrepreneurial experience, namely experience of failure. Each 
estimate applied confirms that general entrepreneurial experience has a positive effect on firm 
growth, whereas failure experience turns out to have a negative impact in the regressions. The 
results of the analyses partly confirm human capital theory: entrepreneurial experience has a 
positive impact on firm performance – provided it is not failure experience. That is, previous 
experience of business ownership enhances firm performance. But this effect is outweighed if 
the previous firm has failed, leading to an overall negative effect. Other experience and 
indicators of higher human capital such as within-industry experience or academic education 
confirm the hypothesis again. Effects of initial experience vanish in the medium term. 
The results suggest that failed entrepreneurs do not benefit from their general entrepreneurial 
experience and are – in terms of employment growth – generally less successful than other 
experienced and novice entrepreneurs. Previously failed entrepreneurs are intimidated, which 
leads to a lowered firm performance. That is, if restart firms survive they contribute (as single 
firms) less to employment creation than other young firms.  
The applied set of variables is, of course, expandable. Effects on growth might arise, for 
example, from the entrepreneur’s social capital, from the specificity of her/his skills or from a 
good match between her/his human capital and the business model applied. Furthermore, a very 
important control measure would be the entrepreneur’s intention to grow (Barkham [1994]). 
Many entrepreneurs have no growth ambitions (Davidsson [1989]). They just want to earn a 
sufficient income (Brüderl and Preisendörfer [1998]) or neglect growth due to non-economic 
reasons; concern about employee well-being is to be cited here, because “growth will 
deteriorate the work atmosphere” (Wiklund et al. [2003]). The motivation to start a new 
business is also an important factor regarding firm success (van Praag [2003]), that should be 
taken into account by future econometric studies of small firm performance (Glancey [1998]). 
However, due to the lack of suitable data I have to make do with the given specification. 
Likewise, for this reason I cannot analyze voluntary firm exits which are economically forced. 
If an entrepreneur closes her/his firm or leaves it because it is no longer economically viable but 
avoids bankruptcy, this would, in principle, also have to count as a business failure.4 
The paper cannot give a clear answer as to why failed entrepreneurs underperform: are they 
discriminated against due to stigmatization? Evidently not: The negative effect still remains 
after accounting for creditworthiness. Do they prefer to proceed cautiously at first? Or are they 
simply worse than the others? These questions afford scope for further research. 
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1  The exit of an entrepreneur is relevant whenever it affects the ‘experience stock’. That is, if the restarter under 
observation exits or the experienced entrepreneur drops out, the observation ends. 
2  See Wooldridge [2002]. Assumptions: (a) (x, y2) are always observed, y1 is observed when y2 = 1; (b) (u1, v2) is 
independent of x with zero mean; (c) v2 ~ Normal(0,1); and (d) E(u1|v2) = γ1v2 (Wooldridge [2002], p.562). 
3  Based on the same data base Metzger [2006] found prima facie a different industry structure. However, 
deviations are due to different analysis levels. His study considered entrepreneurs rather than working at the firm 
level. 
4  Nevertheless, I controlled for effects coming from voluntary firm closures and drop outs of entrepreneurs 
without knowing anything about what triggers them. Both kinds of experience (voluntary closure and drop out) 
have no significant effect on the following firm’s performance. 
